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At its plenary sitting of 16 November 1981 the European Partiament
referred to the Committee on Transport the motion for a resolution by
Mr SHERLOCK and Mr COTTRELL (Doc . 1-701 /81 ) tabLed pursuant to Rute 47
of the Rutes of Procedure.
At its meeting of 27 November 1981 the Committee on Transport
decided to draw up a report on this subject. At its meeting of 26 February
'1982, it appointed Mr JUNOT rapporteur.
At its meetings of 13 Juty,23 September, and 19 October 1982, the
Committee on Transport considered the draft report and at the Last
meeting'it unanimousty adopted the motion for a resoLution as a whote.
The fol.Lowing took part in the vote: Mr SeefeLd, chairman;
Mr Carossino, second vice-chairman; Mr Katoyannis, third vice-chairmani
Mr MicheI Junot, rapporteur; Mr Albers, Mr Cardia, Mr Gabert, Lord Harmar-
NichoLts, Mr Hoffmann, Mr Key, Mr KLinkenborg, Mr Moreland (deputizing
for Mr Marshatt), Mr M. Martin and Mr To[man (deputizing for Mr Vandewiete).
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AThe Committee on Transport hereby submits to the European Partiament the
fol.l.owing motion for a resoIution, together with expIanatory statement :
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
on safgty measures in aircraft
The European ParLiament,
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabted by Mr SHERL0CK and
Mr CoTTRELL pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure on safety
measures in aircraft (Doc. 1-701181)'
- recaLLing its previous resotutions on air transport safety (Doc' 1-211182,
1-2?418O, 1'106179 and 49178),
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Transport (Doc' 1-788182),
A. recognizing the high LeveL of safety in civiL aviation,
B. considering however that the adoption and strict appL'ication of certain
measures wouLd probabLy Lead to a sharp reduetion in the effects on passengers
of survivabte accidents;
C. having regard to experts' reports into air accidents and studies currentLy
being carried out,
1. Draws the attention of the nationat and internationaL authorities and the
manufacturers to the need to review safety standards in aircraft,
particu[arLy tlith regard to the foLtowing points:
- inf[ammabiIity and toxicity of materiats used for the fitting out of
the inside of aircraft,
- design, construction and fixing of seats,
- design and resistance of seat betts (need for-shoutder straps),
- ctosing of overhead Lockers,
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- 
expLicit instructions on the outside of aircraft for aIt professionaI or voLuntary
rescue workers concerning the mechanisms for opening doors and
emergency exits,
- quantity and size of objects alLo*ed in t,he p&lroerupr cabini
2. Expresses the rish that the airIine companics, notwithstanding their
commerciaL considerations rhich are perfect[y understardab[e,
ensure that passengers comp[y more strictLy than hitherto vith cabin
regutations, in particular as regards the number of objects aILowed
in the cabin and the space taken up by such articleo, and that they apply
very strict security rules on the admission of dangerous substances into the
baggage hoLd;
3. Requests airport and aviation authorities to participrte tn ttfs
attempt to improve safety by eetting up effcctive ra3€rrc facitlties for
possible accidents, most of uhich occur at or in the immediate proximity of
airports, and by stricter controL of practicat safety ruLes dr,rring the
boarding of aircraft;
4. Considers that the internationat organizations responsibte for these
matters such as ICA0 and IATA shouLd step up effOrts to enabLe the
rapid modification of regutations;
5. Takes the view, houever, that a specific Europcen egntribution should be
made to internationaL cooperation;
6. Is convjnced that the ftlenber States of the Cotruhity hlvo e direct
interest in coordinating their oun safety standardt rith a vieu both to
saving human Iives and protecting and devetoping the Connlunity aeronautics
i ndust ry;
7. Is aware of the disadvantages invotved for the Comunity in the first
instance of introducing excessivety speclflc and dlscriminotory reguIations;
E. Considers that unifornity of Conmunity cafcty rults rtthin tht fronclork of
{nternationaL standards is tikety to strengthpn the Cor*runity's rOte in inter-
nationaL organizations, by enabting it to re-activat? the vork carried out in
such organizations and, at the same time, euccessfutLy defend its ovn interests;
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l9. BeLieves that it is therefore essentiaL for the community to promote
an aircraft safetY Pot'icY;
10. caLts upon the councit and the commission to study the foLLow'ing
recommendations and to submit to the Counci I' appropriate proposaIs:
- 
uniformity of ICAo safety standards at European LeveL through
the coordination at community tevet of rdifferencesr regarding the
provisions of and annexes to the ohicago convention. This coordination
has begun foLtowing the setting up trithin the ECAC of a group uhich
has studied the uork done jointLy by France, Germany, ItaLy, Spain and
Be Lgi um,
- creation of non-binding Community structures at the Levet of the Member Statesl
airLines and of civiLian airports with a viev to studying, among other things,
ProbLems of safety;
11. Takes the view that these measures should constitute an integraL part of a
generaL air safety poIicy, to compLement air traffic safety, as caLLed for
by the European ParL'iament for many years;
12. Requests the counciL, therefore, to take the necessary steps as soon as
possibte with a view to defining an overaLL air transport poLicy within the
framework of a Community transport poIicy;
13. Instructs.its President to forward this resolution to the counciL and the
Commission of the European Communities, the nationaL ParLiaments and the
IATA, and to request the commission to fortrard it to the ICAo, the ECAC and
other organizations concerned'
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BEXPLAI{TTOBV STATEIffiI{T
I. INTRODUCTION
1. For many years the European Partiarpnt has concerned itsetf with the
safety of air transport.
It has aLready madc,a substanti'al contri'bution in th':is fie[d, as
evidenced by the numerous reports draufl up on, th.i's sqbject, such, as those
by ilr NgE in 197E and 1979 and,, mofe reeerrtly, by rn J*l{SSElrl VAN RAAY in
19E0 and trlr ALBERS thi's year1.
It ritt aLso E recaLLed that a,ptrbti-c hcarring, on tho promotion of
effective air traffic control ras heLd in Paris in 19?9,, on tho. initiative
of the Comnittee on RegionaL PoLicy, RegionaI Ptanning and Transport.
?. Horever, Parliament's *ork has principrtty eoncgrned air @[jjg
satety, in other uords thc improvement of cor.rditions governing the movement
of air traffic.
A further aspcct of air transport safety Goneorns sefQ1y inside air-
craft, and this is the subjeet of the mtion for a resolution by Hn SHERL0CK
and trlr COTTRELL vhich is the starting-point for this report.
3. The authors of the notion for a resolution consider that a number of
accidents coul.d have been avoided, or youtd have been tess serious, if
additionat safety standards had been adoptad.
As noted by i4r SHERLOCK and lilr COTTRELL, various reports of accidents
ctearLy indicate that in many cases the nunber of victias of air disasters
was increased bY:
10o.. 4gllg - trlr Luigi NOE: Prorrotion of efficient air tmffic controt;
Doc. 106/29 -Mr Luigi NOE: Promotion of efficient air traffic manageoGnt
and controtl
Doc. 1-274tg} - ltr J. JANSSEN VAN RAAY : Coordinated Europcen air trnffic
controI systen;
Doc. 1-211t92 - Iir tJiLhem ALEERS : Iilprovement of thc European syste{n
of air traffic controt
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passengers being unabLe to reach the emergency ex'its,
the tateness and inadequacy of the rescue operations,
injuries caused by the poor equipment in aircraft,
the faiture to observe reguLations concerning baggage jn the cabin'
4. Given this consideration, it is quite possibte that the t'ightening up
of certain regu[ations or certain minor technicaL adjustments couLd increase
the reLiabitity of air transport and should therefore be adopted as an
objective at European LeveL.
5. However, in such a highLy technicaL fietd, the Committee on Tran9port
voutd not presume to put forward definitive sotutions.
Effective action couLd be obtained on the other hand, at the more generaI
LeveL of the principLes to be adopted as a basis for a Community aircraft
safety poLicy.
6. Account shouLd atso be taken of the fact that a specificalLy European
poLicy in the fietd of air transport - a fieLd which is necessariLy inter-
nationaL - might carry risks, either by increasing costs for the a'irLine companies,
Hntch rou[d reduce their competitiveness, or by causing the re-routing of
traffic to the benefit of countries neighbouring the Community such as
Sritzertand or Austria.
l. There is therefore a need to fix possibLe fieLds of appLication of
Community measures in close support of the speciaLized internationaL
organi zat i ons.
8. To ensure that this report faLLs within a sufficientty prec'ise frame
of reference, probtems concerning security uithin aircraft wiLt not be taken
into consideration. Your rapporteur feeLs that questions of safety and
security cannot be deaLt rith together, given that the causes thereof are
respectivety accidentaI and voluntary-
Furthermore, the report wiLL deaL sotety with commerciat aviation.
This does not mean that aviation in generat is not equatty concerned, but
it rouLd be difficuLt in this particular report to deaL in an identical
manner with tro such specific fietds.
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II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON AIR SAFETY
9. It is something of a paradox that, uhereas air transport is
objgctivety one of the safest m6ans of travel trhich exists, pubtic
opinion remains extremety sensitive to problems of safety in air
t ransport .
Houever, it is hardty possibte to compare the 3001000 deaths
caused each year throughout the worLd by road transport and the
average of 800 deaths a year which occur in cornmercial ev iation, even
if these figures are ueighted by the number of passengers transported and
ki Lometres traveLted.
10. In addition, not onty is the standard of safety in air transport
extremety high, but it has been consistentty improved in recent years
as shown by the fot[oring tabte :
Accidents having caused the death of passengers - scheduLed air services
1962 - 19E0
L962
I964
r965
r968
I970
L972
1971
1976
1978
1980
29
,25
3I
35
28
42
29
20
25
?o
778
6r6
'1t@r
9r2
687
lr2lo
L,299
734
7s5
747
o.60
o.35
o.44
o.29
O' 18
o.26
o.24
o. t2
o.09
o.08
o.90
o.68
o,59
o.58
o.40
o. s8
0.39
o.26
o.29
o.?1
Source : ICAO (not inctuding USSR)
Passengers I deaths per
kiLl.ed mi[[ion Per 100 miLt- | eer'100,000passenger/ ion kilometreq hours fLight
Number of
a'i rcraf t
acc identi'
o.37
o.30
631
o.32
o.23
o.34
o.23
o. 15
o.18
o.L3
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Year.
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It may be further deduced from these statistics that the number of
accidents per m'iLLion f t'ights has fatlen to 1 for Europe and the Un'ited
states as against 3 for the yorLd as a whole (excLuding china and the ussR)'
11. There .is onLy a SuperficiaI contradiction, however, between these
considerations on the existing safety conditions in air transport and the
aim of this report, rhich is to reduce the number of persons injured or
kiLLed in air disasters. These considerations serve simp[y to point out
that the Committee on Transport is fut[y aware of the s'ignificant progress
made in this fiel.d and the high Level of safety which currentty exists.
They aLso enabte us to understand more fuLl'y the areas in which further
progress can be made and under vhich conditions'
EIANE-Ag9I9ENI9-i-EAIN-EEAIUBE g
12. In the fieLd of transport, detaited enquiries into c'ircumstances
and causes of air disasters far outnumber those into other accidents.
Governments, airtines, manufacturers and the speciatized internationaI
organizations devote themsetves to a considerabLe amount of work in this
fieLd, and indeed this is one of the reasons for the low number of accidents.
ConcLusions are drayn after each accident uhich make it possibLe to avoid
the repetition of identicaL disasters or at Ieast minimize the possibiLity
thereof. Analyses of these accidents are to be found in the immense
voLume of documentation pubLished by the ICA0, IATA or nationaL authoritiesl.
13. The main feature of the causes of these accidents (even though these
causes are many and inter-reLated) is the determinant significance of the
human factor.
In such an extremety technicat fietd in which there is retativety
LittLe chance of mechanicaL fai[ure, there is no doubt that the infLuence
of man is decisive. Tro examptes wiLt suffice to ittustrate this point.
lOne such source are the ICAO circutars entitLedrAircraft accident digest'
which List accidents rlhich occlur over a g'iven period. For each accident,
a uhote range of detailed information is provided covering the weather
conditions at the time of the accident, the recording of communications,
the examination of the aircraft involved in the accident and conctusions
on the probabte causes. pE ?Z.616lfin.
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The disaster rhich occurred in 1977 at TENERIFE in the Canary
Isl.ands invoLving trc BoEING 74?s as each ras advancing on a runh'aY of
the airport hras apparentLy due, according to the'results otf the enquiry,
to a misunderstanding caused by the poor quatity of instructions given
by the controt tower. This cottision, rhich occurred on the ground,
caused the death of 5?3 persons, representing the most serious accident
in the history of aviation.
yet more recentty, in September 1981, the accident invotving a
yugostav charter ptane on its approach to AJACCIO airport uas apparentLy
due to an incorrect interpretation by the pilot of instructions given by
the contro[ torer. Human faiLure is by no means Limited to communications
betueen the pLane and ground controI and may also result from non-compIiance
yith existing regulations or improper utiIization of equipment.
This inftuence of the human factor is confirmed by the fact that there
are three times ferer accidents in the USA and Euro.pe, rhere the training
of personnel. is particutarly thorough, than in the rest of the world.
13. The second feature of air disasters is that most of them occur near
an airport, as shorn by the foLl.oring tabte rhich concerns 79 cases studied
by the American NationaI Transportation Safety Board:
Aircraft stationary or advancing on run|ray
Takeoff
Gaining fLight
Cruising
Descending
Approaching
Landi ng
Tota t 40(H
24
12
4
25
2t+
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0veraLt, the above figureS are simiLar to those of the TechnicaI service
for air navigation in France, according to which 757 of accidents occur
rithin a radius of 3 kilometres from runuays.
This information demonstrates the importance of and need for safety
insta[ [ations at airports.
14. FinatLy, unlike accidents which occur in other modes of transport,
the proportion of deaths by comparison with the number of passengers
invoLved in accidents is extremety high. as shoun by the foLtowing
tabLe pubLished by the lcA0 concerning the period 1975-1980:
1975 1976 19?7 1978 1979 1980
Accidents having caused the
deaths of passengers. 20 20 ?4 25 31 ?O
Passengers ki tLed. 443 734 516 755 E79 747
passenger survivors. 7? 122 169 731 239 635
15. A distinction shouLd be draun here between 'survivabter and
,non-survivabte, accidents. A survivabte accident is one in bJhich the
force by nhich the occupant is st_ruck through his or her seat and seat-be[t
does not exceed the Limits of human tolerance to vioLent acce[eration
and in yhich the structure of the environment remains substantiaLLy
intact, thereby enabting the occupant to survive'
This definition used by the NationaI Transportation Safety Board,
rhich is admittedLy subjective, is designed to identify those cases where
irnproved safety could reduce the number of deaths and injured' Survivabte
accidents therefore constitute a significant area of our invest'igation'
-13- PE 77.67611in.
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16. The causes of death and injuries in survivab[e accidents may be
divided into four categories:
(a) fire and its consequences, i.e. burns or intoxication;
(b) difficutties in evacuating passengers;
(c) transformation of baggage or other objects in the passenger cabin
into projecti [es;
(d) insufficient rcisistance of equipment inside the.passenger cabin
(seats, seat-be[ts, various other equipment).
Je)--lises
17. Estimates of the number of deaths due to fires vary considerably
(principatty as regards the definition of death caused by fire). At the
very least, over 502 of deaths are coneidered to be caused by fire.
The accident in 1973 invotving a Boeing 7O7 of the Brazilian air[ine
VARIG is undoubtedl.y the accident rhich has nost contributed towards
recognition of the seriousness of fires in the passenger cabin.
The fire broke out in the toitets a few minutes before landing and
it proved impossibte to put it out with portabte extinguishers. The
piLot made a forced tanding, after smoke had invaded the passenger cabin
and the cockpit, in the course of uhich the ptane did not suffer any
serious structuraI damage. Hotrever, the plane's fuel caught fire after
the ptane had come to a ha[t.
Onl.y the ten members of the crel, and one passenger survived. Irlost of
the victims rere found stiL[ attached to their seats. They had not been
burnt ative but asphyxiated by the smoke and toxic cornbr.tstion gases.
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18. A standard Long-hauL carrier contains approximatety 4 tonnes of materiaI
of organic origin, most of which is synthetic, in particutar plastic. Such
materiaL is used for the fitting out and decorat'ion of the passenger cabin
(covering of the waLIs, ceiLing, ftoor, seats, etc.). ALt the materiats
used are governed by specific standardsl as regards their degree of inf[am-
mability, tlame propagation, emanation of'smoke and toxic gas.
Thus accidents cannot simpty be ascribed to the absence of any ru[es
in this area, aLthough many speciaLists maintain that these rutes are not
appropriate in Practice.
In an articterwhich appeared in INTERAVIA magaz'ine on the resistance
of aircraft to fire(, the author states that, in theory, it shouLd be easy,
in most cases, to setect materiaL which is'safe'. But an anatysis of
reat accidents and simu[ated passenger cabin fires indicates that materiats
cIassified as , setf-extinguishabLe' spread ftames. There is increasing
feel"ing that Laboratory tests on smaLL heated or inflamed samptes under
meticutous[y controLLed conditions are not reatistic inasmuch as they do
not faithfutty reproduce the conditions of reaI fires.
This opinion would seem justified by the fact that the FAA has undertaken
very Large scaLe tests in this fiel.d in recent years ulhich apparentty have
not yet been compl.eted. The systematic repLacement of at teast the most
infl.ammabLe materiaLs, by other conventionaL but uninftammabte materiaIs
uoutd tead to a significant increase in we'ight and hence the need to
reduce the number of seats.
This uouLd raise probtems at the Levet of competition for manufacturers
and airtines obLiged to accept such changes'
1fh" 1CRO, with the assistance of the Airworthiness Committee, has produced
a document entitLed'The Airuorthiness TechnicaI Manuat (Doc. 9051 AN E96)',
which contains inter aLia a chapter on the inftammabiLity features of
interior materiats.
2t*te*OVtA magazine No. 8 - 1979 - p.557 - Resistance of aircraft to fire -
neu standards are necessary - Chris BuL[och'
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19. Research is also being undertaken with a vieu to reducing the risks
of confLagration of accidentaLLy spiLt fue[. Such spittages are fair[y
frequent in accidents in nhich the plane has been unabte to jettison its
fueL. In particuLar, consideration is being given to the use of a
process rhereby an additive is mixed h,ith the fuet, the emutsive action
of rhich rouLd prevent the fueL from spreading as highLy inflammabte
f Iames.
?0. StiIt as rega?ds protection against the danger of fire in aircraft,
trtr SHERLoCK and llr COTTRELL, in their motion for a resolution, point to the
rextra danger caused by the presence rithin the cabin of considerabte
quantities of inf[ammabte Liquid such as atcoho[ and perfumes', the absence
of uhich yould reduce the ueight carried and thus fuet consumption, as
yetI as noise during take-off and Landing. They advocate changes in the
rutes on duty-free purchases in order to remedy this situation.
By comparison nith the 100-2001000 Litres of fueI carried by long-hauI
carriers, approximateLy 1OO Litres of inftammab[e products on board rou[d
not seem to provide serious grounds for concern. This is merety a
secondary factor, as is atso the ueight of such products and,
consequentLy, their infLuence on noise and fueL consumption.
21. Finatty, with regard to the possibitities of fire or the propagation
thereof, and the cause of other possibLe dangers to passengers on aircraft,
ue come to the lIe0Eegll-e!-dengelggg-99b9lelgeE.
Ptanes frequent[y carry in their holds, as freight, potentiaLLy
dangerous goods: exptosive substances and objects, compressed, Iiquefied
or pressurized gas, inftammabte subStances, combustive, toxic, infectious,
corrosive or radioactive matter, etc.
The transport of such goods may expose passengers to serious risk
in the event of inadequate packaging, the simuLtaneous carriage of incompatibte
substances or the accidentaI deterioration of such goods. Above att, they
may be a source of fire or become an aggravating factor in the event of minor
accidents and particuLar precautions must be taken.
It is something of a paradox that, with the exception of the se[f-
regutatory actions taken by IATA members, the transport of dangerous goods
-16- PE 77.676
by pLane is not subject to any internat'ionaI norms. Houever, the counciL
of the ]CAQ adopted, on 26 June 1981, an Annex 18 to the Ch'icago Crlnvention
on the safety of the carriage by air of dangerous goods. Neverthetess,
this annex wiLL take effect onty on 1 January 1983 and wiLt become applicabLe
on 1 January 1984. This Lack of reguLations, which witI undoubtedLy be made
good in the near future, is Somewhat atarmingr given that the transport of
dangerous substances is governed by specific norms for the other modes of
transport. Careful. attention must be paid to the appLication of these
future norms in order to reduce a risk factor which is far from negLigibl-e'
Some countries are horever aIready adopting nationaL regutations identicaL uith
those of the IcAo.
(b) Euerggngy-eveggellgn-9!-Peggg0gsrg
ZZ. The accident uhich occurred in 1980 invoLving a Saudi Arabian Airtines'
ptane which caused the death of 301 persons, cited in the motion for a
resolution by ltr SHERLOCK and Mr C0TTRELL, is significant.
A fire broke out on board (probabLy caused by a passenger using a gas
cooking appliance) and the rescue teams were unabte to open the doors: the
passengers were burnt al.ive or asphyxiated inside the cabin.
23. The evacuation of passengers is not only Linked to the dangers of fire
which ue have considered above, but is atso a factor in each accident' The
evacuation of passengers is not atrays carried out under the best of condit'ions,
and the naturaL atmosphere in such situations is one of panic.
At the tevel of the construction of aircraftr given the standards
required by certificates of airworthiness, the design of doors and emergency
exits rould not seem to raise major probtems.
Atthough comprehensive ru[Cs exist as regards emergency evacuationl,
certain speciaLists beIieve that they cou[d be tightened up.
For exampte, as regards operating emergency exits from the outside,
jnstrr.rctims qr theatterbruoutd f aci Litate the provision of more rapid assistance
in the event of accidenti,particuLarty rhen they occur outside airports, given
that airport firemen are trained to be abte to open emergency exits from the
outside.
-.JAR Rutes - FAR - 25811 and 812
- Airworthiness TechnicaL Manua[ (Doc- 9051 AN/E96)
Chapter I - Emergency provisions - ICAO
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Emphasis shoutd be Laid on the y!!e!-!Up9t!Angg-91-eiCpef!-eqetggngy
ggll!.ggS, the quality, size in terms of personneL and equipment of which
is a factor in reducing the number of deaths and injured in air disasters.
24. One of the factors frequentLy cited as an obstac[e to emergency
evacuations is the quantity and size of baggage permitted within the cabin.
The probtem here is not one of regutations, for they are extremely precise
1in this matter', but of their apptication by the airtine compan'ies.
It frequent[y happens that passengers insist on carrying urith them
considerabte amounts of baggage, either because they are carrying fragi[e
objects or in order to avoid waiting at the airport. The airtines, for
commerciat reasons, do not appLy the rules on personaL hand baggage
sufficientty strict Ly.
Houever, action should be taken by, on the one hand, ail. the
airtines at the tevel of their commerciaI services to make passengers
understand that stricter comptiance with the rutes is nothing tess than
an effective safety measure and, on the other hand, by the aviation
authorities rith a viev to carrying out frequent checks on board at the
time of take-off.
( c ) Irenslesoe!ien-!n!e-preiesu!st-g!-!essess-e0d-e!Iec-sEisstg-!o-!!e-gebio
25. Hand baggage may not onty constitute a physicaI obstac[e to the evacuation
of passengers but may atso be transformed into dangerous projectites. This
may even occur in the event of minor incidents during the ftight which shoutd.
not noroat[y, cause any damage to passengers.
A restriction on hand-baggage is one of the firs! measures to be taken
in order to reduce this type of accident. HohJever, further risk is
represented by overhead tockers uhich sometimes faiI to remain closed.
The experts consutted fee[ that this is more of a problem of the
standard of maintenance of aircraft than an unsatisfactory des'ign of the
system for closing tockers. They base this vieu on the fact that, in
identicaL planes, lockers remain ctosed more or less often depending on the
company in question (cases of tockers which faiI to c[ose property mainty
concern pIanes betonging to non-l{estern companies).
lrRn ReguLations 91-201 b.
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1.lhatever the rights and wrongs of this argument, it shouLd be acknowtedged
that progress at the tevel of the design of such tockers, in particular as
regards systems for cLosing them, cou[d be achieved without undue difficutty.
If we betieve, as indicated above, that purchases of aLcohoI in duty-free
shops do not increase the risk of fire, there is no doubt that the transport of
duty-free articles purchased upon departure take up considerabte room in cabins
and may be transformed into dangerous projectites'
lvlr sHERLoCK and Mr CoTTRELL make the interesting suggestion that purchases
shouLd be made on arrivat and not on departure, but this tlould raise certain
probtems. First of aLt, it is contrary to the principLe of remission of duty
for export, i.e. upon departure from a country; it would therefore
be a contrad'iction in terms. In addition, passengers have more time
at their disposaL when Leaving an airport than on arrivat, uhen they trish to
teave the airport as rapidly ag possible.
FinaLLy, your rapporteur, aHare of the revenue which these shops provide
for airports, does not nish to enter into the discussion of whether they shouLd
be maintained or abotished in a Europe without frontiers. Houlever, if ue
Here to consider this possibitity of purchasing duty-free goods from a
practicat viewpoint, i.e. as a priviLege granted to traveIters crossing
Community frontiers by boat or ptane, ue could then envisage that purchases
might be made uPon arrivat-
According to the speciaLists trith whom your rapporteur has been in
contact, an extremety usefut measure vhich could be taken immediatety woutd
be the ggggglgglf-pgglgging of aLcohot and perfumes 'in order to reduce the
risk of these objects being transformed into sharp-edged projectites'
(d) Insslligiqn!-tegigleEss-9!-in!scnq!-sebi0-essipoen!.-gee!e.-9eq!:bs!!g'
veriesg-9!!es-ssgiPEg0!
?6. In many accidents the survival of passengers is determined not by the
timits of human toLerance to acceteration but by the nature of the equipment
inside the cabin such as seats and seat-beLts'
This opinion is contained in a
National. Transportation Safety Board
recent pubLication of the American
(NTSB) on safety in aircraft cabins'
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??. The experts entrusted yith this report studied 77 cases of survivab[e
accidents uhich occurred after 1970 and invotved over 41800 passengers. ln
g5t of the cases studied, seats faiLed to resist or to remain fixed to the
f [oor.
ln 221 0f the cases seat-betts faiLed to remain fastened.
0ther equipment inside
the passenger seats, Parts of
a contributory factor in 782
Fina[[y, various other
kitchen including containers
cases examined.
the cabin, such as the panets Located above
the baggage lockers and foLding tabtes, ras
of the cases examined.
equipment, particutarty that used in the
and utensi [s, caused damage in 622 of the
ZB. The consequences of this situation can be seen at tuo levets: directty
in the form of injuries rhich are sometimes fata[ resutting from the non-
resistance of internaL equipment, and indirectty by their preventing
passengers from evacuating the aircraft in the event of fire, particular[y
by making passengers lose consciousness - even for a fe11 moments - which
may be of vitaI importance in such cases.
29. Furthermore, the report caLl.s into question the design of the seats
(resistance and ergonomics) and the ineffectiveness of seat-beLts. 0n
this Last point, it is indeed surprising that use is made exclusively of
,abdominalr betts fixed at tuo points. Even if, in the event of a sudden
jol,t, the abdominal. bett prevents the body from being throrn out of the
seat, it does not prevent a violent jott foruards trhich can cause extremety
serious injury to the vertebraL cotumn, which could almost aLrays be
avoided by the fixing of a shoutder-strap. In addition, the NTSB catts
directLy into queStion current rules on the points mentioned above and
points out that these rutes are based on standards laid down over thirty
years ago.
This judgement of the NTSB is undoubtedly severe. Holever, given
that it comes from an official American control organization, we have no
choice but to take account of these observations. It wou[d be interesting
to undertake comparabte studies in Europe-
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30. In short, this analysis of the causes of death and injury in accidents
demonstrates that the safety of passengers in air transport cou[d be further
improved in a number of significant areas.
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V. BSIEIEtE-S8EgI!-EE8SUBE9
31. Ulithout attempting to draw definitive and exhaustive conctusions on this
subject, it would seem that passenger safety coutd be promoted by a series of
actions at the foltoring three LeveLs:
- aircraft manufacturers
- airIines
- airport and aviation authorities
(a) 4lcgre!!-uensleg!urels
3?. ilanufacturers are reasonabLy arrare of the fact that progress can and must
beachieved.InlgS0rtheFAAandNASAgrantedatotal'of300'000dol'larsto
BOEING, LOCKHEED AND I'|ACDOf{NELL DOUGLAS for studies on types of accidents and
causes of death. This research also concerns cabin equipment' the main
structureofthefusetage,thefixingofenginesandfueLtanks.
33. It t|ouLd appear that the manufacturers shouLd pay particutar attention
to the fottoring areas:
- re-exanination of the design of aLL cabins in the tight
of the NTSB study and other comptementary studies trhich
may be undertakeni particuLar attention shouLd be paid
to the fixing and design of seats' the use of seat-betts
fixed at three points, the cLosing of baggage tockers, and aL[
internal equipment factors uhich nay' by not resisting
sufficient[y, cause death and injury;
- standards governing the inftammabitity and toxicity of
internat equipment shouLd be reviered under conditions
effectiveLy corresponding to those under which accidents
oc cur;
- nore detaited research into fire-fighting methods' part-
icutarl'y with the aim of reducing the degree of conftagration;
- 
possibty, placing on the outside of the aircraft of
instructions which shouLd be as explicit as possibLe
thereby nraking it possibLe to open doors and emergency
exitsfromtheoutsideinaLLsituations,inparticuLarto
assist non-speciatized rescue teams'
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(b) AirLines
34. The most effective reguLations are vaLid onLy if they are properLy comp[ied
.n'ith by the airLines and this is not aLrays the case, as is demonstrated by the
examples of fines imposed on airtines in the USA. ln 1979 four targe airLines
rrere sentenced to heavy fines for atLeged vioLations of safety regutations' This
non-compLiance with the rutes concerned, for exampLe, the maintenance of aircraft
by PACIFIC SOUTHWEST, and the use by BRANNIFF INTERNATIONAL of a B 717 with rectining
seats which made it difficuLt or impossibte to open the emergency exits.
Lle shouLd not generaLize or exaggerate on the basis of these cases, but it is
neverthetess necessary to ensure compLiance wih the existing ruLes and controI
thereof.
35. AirLines shoutd concentrate their efforts on the foLtowing:
the norms taid down in Annex 18 to the Chicago
possib[e without uaiting for its entry'into force on
for the transport of dangerous goods;
strict comptiance by passengers with the number of hand baggage articLes
attoyed per passenger in the cabin and possible restriction on such hand
baggage in terms of weight and size;
maintenance of internaI fixed eLements such as baggage tockers to ensure
that their deterioration does not give rise to potentiat danger;
scrupuLous carrying out of the safety drjLL by the crew for the benefit
of passengers; it might atso be possibte to increase the frequency of
these compuLsory dritLs aLthough this m'ight instiL fear into passengers
vhich is of course undesirabte.
(c) Aicpec!-eod-evie!ieE-es!heri!ies
36. A considerabte proportion of pLane accidents take ptace in the immediate
proximity of airports, uhich therefore have a Leading rote to pLay in the organization
of rescue procedures.
Airports must possess effective means in terms of manporer and equipment, enabting
them to intervene rapidty and deat urith atL the different situations rhich may arise'
permanent intensive training courses for staff on the organization of rescue
- comptiance rith
Convention, if
1 JanuarY 19E4'
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Hork in aIt commerciat airports uould atso prove extreme[y usefuL, notwithstand.ing
the fact that in many cases the probabtitity of having to deat with an accident is
extremeIy IotJ.
37. The aviation authorities have an extremety inportant role to pl'ay in ensurlng :
comptiance with rutes by manufacturers and, above att, by the airLines. Freguent
and random controts backed by sanctions shoutd facititate a stricter appIication
of the existing regutations.
VI. E9E-A-EUBqBEAN-AIESESEI-S4EEII-EgtlgI
38. Consideration shoutd be given to the most suitabLe framework in which the
measures advocated for improving safety in aircraft (fixing of nev standards,
changes to regutations, etc.), should be carried out-
Even if the international nature and historicat traditions of air transport
youLd seem to rute out purety nationaL sotutions, internationaL cooperation a[one,
hoyever highLy desirabte at rorLd Levet, is subject to serious naturaL timitations,
oring to its non-binding nature and the stovness of decision-making.
Community measuresr given that they may be carried out over a vast territory
yith a high density of air traffic, couLd be integrated into an overaLL poticy of
air transport safety and cou[d therefore be of particuLar importance. Neverthetess,
other factors come into pLay rhich, rithout ca.tting into question the possibitity
of Community measures, shou the timitations to which they wou[d be subject.
(a) gsccen!-cesslelery-Ireoswc!
39. A distinction shouLd be drarn, at the tevel of safety standards, between
internationaI and nationaI measures
A!_io!gtDe!igOa!_!gyg!, the principaI framework is the Convention relating
to civiL and internationat aviation and the ICAo recorrmended norms and practices
annexed thereto. The ICAO Lras set up within the framevork of the 1944 Chicago
Convention in which 52 States participated, vith the exctusion of Russia and
China, and t.lhich tedto the adoption of the Convention on InternationaI CiviL
Aviation. This text, aLthough it constitutes the essentiaL basis of pubtic law
in the fieLd of air transport rith regard to scheduted services, is nevertheless
timited by the text of its first artic[e rhich stipuLates that each tttember State
possesses compLete and exc[usive sovereignty over the atmospheric air space above
its territory. According to ArticLes 37 and 38 of the Chicago Convention, States
undertake to contribute touards the attainment of the highest possib[e degree
of uniformity in regu[ations and standards and, rhere necessary, to communicate
-24- PE 77.676 ttin.
any differences which exist betyeen the standards taid down by the ICA0 and their
ghrn nationaI reguLations and practices. The foLLowing annexes part'icuLarIy
concern safety prob[ems:
* Annex 1
* Annex 2
* Annex 6
* Annex 8
* Annex 12
't Annex 13
* Annex 18
personnet ti cences
rutes of the air
technicat use of aircraft
airvorthiness certificates of aircraft
search and rescue
inquiries into ptane accidents
(draft) transport of dangerous goods.
.AttheLeveLoftheairlinesrueshouLdnotethe'importanceofthelnternational
Air Transport Association (IATA). The purpose of IATA is to faciLitate internationaI
a.ir transport and, through the cooperation of its members, to ensure coordination
in a Large number of areas for the benefit of passengers' Not onLy does it deat
Hith air fares, but aLso with technicaL probtems such as the standardization of
in-ftight equipment and ground instaLLations, the fitting out of airports' etc.,
together t,ith prObtems retating to environmentat protection' Some interesting
uork has also been done by the Attas group and NSFF (Nethertands' Scandinavian
countries, SwitzerLand and France)'
Since 1g67 LATA has compiLed anaLyticat data supptied by its member companies
concerning tnear-missest .
SafetY therefore constitutes
activities.
a direct or indirect objective of many of its
40. A!-ne!igng!-!gyg!, States have their orn rutes' In France' manufacturers
and users are subject to: 1
:t the certification ruLes of TSFACTJ) Service
de ta Formation A6ronautique et du Contr6te
Tec hn i que,
*thetechnicaLcontroLandoperationaLandmain-
tenance rutes of SFACT1,
* contro[s earried out by the VERITAS office
1
amongst others, on behaLf of SFACT''
These ruLes and controLs come under the Directorate-GeneraL for civiL Aviation
and are appLicabte to ptanes constructed in France and to those buitt abroad
but registered in France.
G-*-.*"ce rith the civi L Aviation code
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41. In the other
such as the rutes
of the Luftfahrt
Community countries an identicaI regutatory framework exists,
of the civiL Aviation Authority in thg united K'ingdom or those
Bundesant in GcrmanYe Qtc'
4?. Nationat ruLes resemble aach other ctosely and are LargeLy based on those
of the American FederaI Aviation Agency (FAA).except, to a certain extent, in France
and in the United Kingdom.
By Law, in order to ensur6 comptiange hrith its o11n rutes, a country may
prohibit any ptane yhich faits to compLy fron fLying over its territory' However'
for export purposes, manufacturers must obtain not onty a nationat airworthiness
certificate but also a certificate of the country to uhich they hope to sett their
p Ianes.
6 ) Psssi!!e-e!lsslsrcs-le-iuplgve-se!e!Y-esgiens-in-airsrelt
lEepsqegien-i!- gsrepe
43. Any discussioni of airtranspoit probLems'in Europe is bound to refer to the
roLe p[ayed by the European civiL Aviation conference (ECAC)'espec'iaLl'y on econom'ic
questions.Thisbody,l'iketheConferenceofEuropeant{inistersofTransport(cEMT),h,as
setupontheinitiativeoftheCounciLofEuropebytheConferenceonthecoordination
of air traffic in Europe convoked by the IGAO in strasbourg in April 1954' 
Since its
creationinlg55,theConferencehasconstitutedasortofregionaLbranchoflCA0inEurope
Itr tasks inctude the monitoring of the devetopmgnt of air traffic in
Europe rith a vie}, to pronoting coordination betreen its members and hence improved
profitabitity in this sector of transport.
0rig.inaLLy consisting of 19 statqs, the conference cqrrgntLy has 21 members
(incLuding YugosLavia which joined ECAC in 1977). Atthough it is not subordinate
to the IcAo, the programmes of work of the ICAO and EcAc are ctosety coordinated'
ECAC concentrates mainl.y on air transport probLpns. l'lo{Fver, ECAC's technicaI
committee aLso considers the European aspects Of the imptementation of the
recommended ruLes and practices Laid dor*n by the ICA0 in the fietd of air transport'
44. Mention shoutd al,so be nade of the European 6roup an Air Transport Planning,
which is directLy responsibl.e to the ICAO and cgncerns itself ryith air transport
probtems in the European region. It undertakes 0 gqntinuous eXaaination Of the
situation in Europe and recofinends any appropriate 49tion to the European states'
Your rapporteur rould atso recaLt the existence of EUrOContro[, on which
parr.iament has recentLy again expressed a favourabte opinion.l
--------------1 ResoLution voted on 16 Ju[y on the basis of the report by filr. ALBERS on behalf of
the Committee on Transporti'Improvement of the European system qf air traffic
control' Doc. 1-?11182 pE 77.676ttin.
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lThese different speciatized authorities, of which there are many more, have
a decisive roLe to ptay in strengthening safety standards in Europe' However, it
shouLd be pointed out that none of them possesses the power of decision'
geossni!v-ee!ien
45. The European community, aLthough it has not so far defined any specific
poLiticaL Line aimed at improving air transport safety, adopted on 16 December 1980
a directive ,on the future cooperation and mutuaL assistance between the Merrber
states in the fietd of air accident investigation'1, the text of which is annexed-
This directive provides for mutuaL assistance in the form of exchanges of informat'ion
concerning accidents invoLving civiI aircraft'
It shouLd be noted that the Counci L did not
ParIiament's opinion on this directive (drawn up
The existence of this text, even if its
that the Council, attaches some'importance to
of air transport safety-
consider it necessary to ask for
on the basis of a German ProPosa[)'
scope 'is ext reme Ly L i m'ited, i ndi cates
action at Community leveL in the fieLd
c) lnpgr!anse-end-!LEi!e!iens-sI-!sqosni!v-eg!ieD
46. The frameuork of the Community affords certain evident advantages in terms
of a sufficientLy extensive geographicat a?ea, economic unity, advanced economic
integration at the LeveL of aircraft construction (the airbus) and an institutionaI
framework under which rutes can be introduced fairty rapidLy and appIied direct[y'
In addition, the need for a European system of a'ir traffic controL' as
requested by ParLiament on nunerous occasions, wouLd undoubtedLy have the effect
of strengthening the idea of instituting specificaLLy Community ru[es governing
safety within aircraft, the second aspect of air safety.
47. It might seeem tempting to propose the setting up at Community Level of an
authority responsibLe for the enactment of and compLiance with air safety ru[es'
on the Linesof the FederaL Aviation Agency in the United states. Horever, in'
addition to the political factors connected uith the degree of uiLtingness of
the nationaI authorities to transfer their authority in this fietd to a
1 Directive 80/1Z66IEECz 0J No.L375,31 -12.1980
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European body of this nature, other obstactes exist which cannot be ignored.
Indeed, the question might be qsked as tg Ehelhgr the European
abte to Lay down specif ic ruLes, dif{er.ent tCo,q thOseuhich currentty
countries, trith the risk of the Community becoming isotated within
which is nothing if not intq.rna,tiqnQt.
Community i s
exist in other
a sector
48. The consequences of such a situation mQy be perceived at severaL [eve[s:
- for the manufacturers, the adaptation of aircraft to specific
EEC standards youtd involve additionaI expenditure for research and
construction and hence an increase in the cost of production. European
manufacturers routd be pLaced in a particu[arIy deticate situation:
routd they be compeLted to manufactr;re atL their products in accordance
with Community standards or rould they hayq q, proqHgtion [ine for the
rest of the wortd uith a lorqr [eve[ qf retiqbitity ?
for European airtines, apart from the fact that their competitiveness
would be reduced by the obtigation to purchasg more sophisticated and
therefore more expensive qilcraft, they rr_ou[d etig Fe subject to further
controLs. FinaLLy, if airLines fr:on qq!$iqg thg Ef;Q ryere to be forced to
comply uith additional. ruLes, they migtt H?tL- over and above the resutting
risk of latent confLict - rerou,fe fLis..htE ]q end floq the countries
neighbouring the Community, such as SryitZSftqqCr Austria. 9r Sweden-
In any caqe, th9 open structure of the Curopgin q?rkgt, and its
partiat technploqical d?penCence qn the u,nitgd Sf?tFEl lqqld make such
measurqs dangerous and aboye ail., ineffegtiyg ,qs feg?rCs attairyelt of
the desired aim, and tl},ts fprms e liBit Iq Sny tqfqtgd
European action.
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49. There routd seem to exist a middLe way between internat'ionat cooperation
timited by the sLouness of procedures (or indeed the Lack of decisions) and the
constitution of a body of specificaLty Community rules. This middte course wou[d
be for measures to be introduced in comptiance uith the existing internationaL
measures and stimuIate internationaL cooperation through a ctose and batanced
re[ationship with the United States with a view to improving air safety ruLes.
50. The effectiveness of a poLicy depends above aL[ on the extent to which it
is reatistic. 11e cannot ignore the fact that the situation varies considerab[y
from one Community country to another. Your rapporteur would point out again
that States notify the ICAo of difierences uhich may exist between the ICAo Rules
and their oyn.
- Any anaLys'is of the position of each t{ember State of the Community wiLL
indicate s'ign'ificant differences by comparison with the situation in the other
Member States.
51. Initial, and substantiat progress would be achieved by attempting to define
common 'differencest within the Community as compared with ICAO RuLes.
It shouLd be relatively easy in this particuLar fieLd, once agreement has
been reached on the principLe invoLved, to coordinate such differences progressiveLy
at Community Levet, annex by annex, according to their degree of difficuLty or
significance.
Negotiations coutd be opened simuLtaneous[y with the Commun'ity's neighbouring
countries, in particuLar SritzerLand, Austria, the Scandinavian States and the
candidate countries, withaviey to defining a joint tine of action and seLecting
joint options in the fietd of air safety.
52. By adopting rutes rhich are identicaI for atL the [vlember States, the Community
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would also be in a position to pLay a msre effective roLe lithin the various
internationaIorganizatlOns yhich solk for the it@rdVgment of air safety standards.
At present, European couhtfi6s dr€ uhattC in lsOtation to counterbatance
the roLe pLayed by the United States, which urtdoubtedty possesses a technotogicaI
hoLdoverthis secto. iotrithrtanding strikitrg success, such as the Airbus InduStries,
for exampte.
5j. A further usefut eLement in the Community approach voutd be action to
incite European airl.ines to introduce a code Of cohduct governing the practicat
adoption of certain safety standards, such as those indicated above, vhich might
concern either the strict Limitation of the number and size of cabin baggage, or
a certain tightening up of the rutes for maintiitttng aircraft, or indeed by
studying the introduction of seat-beIts trlth shoutder-straps.
The need here yould be to set up efionE the Euiopeen iirLines a specific
structure comparabte to thatof the rcrdpof 10' iorrai[nay undertakings, the effectivene
of which has been clearty Proved.
The same mechanism coutd aLso be appLJedr through cLose coLlaborat'ion, to the
airports of the Community countries by settlnE up dfi 6utonoitlous group within thO
Internationat Civi t Airports Association (ICAA).
54. At.though he has deaLt mainty sith the FlObleflrs 6f gdfety in aircraft, the subj
of this report, your rapporteut ls reLI arrare thet gAfety ttr the fieLd of air
transport represents dn ovdtrllL cohc0pt. It i3 egsentJaL to harmonize the various
measures concerned dn the basis 6f 6n DverrLl. apprUtch tU Salety plobLem, and atso t
supplement the recomilehdatlohs inade by thE Europ€gh pdrl.icilt6ht in tts previous report
on air transport sdfety.
55. L,ith this aim in vi€w, it routd bb of the greetest u6tue if the Commission
were to establish or have estabLished as soon as possibLe and prior to any spec'if'lc
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proposat for action, possibLe main tines of a European poL'icy ih the generaL f iel'd of
air transport safety, whiLe taking accornt of the views of representat'ives of specia['ized
organizations and the need to compty uith existing irrternationaL rules and paying due
regard to the possibLe consequences of such action on probLems of competition'
vII. EqNcLUglgNg
56. The merit of the mot'ion for a resoLution tabLed by Mr' SHERLOCK and Mr'
COTTRELL, w'ithout which this report woutd not have been drawh UPr is to have
brought into focus the fact that, even within a fietd such as a'ir transport
uherethel.evetofsafetyispart.icuLarLyhigh,possibil.itiesexistforimproving
safety stil.l. further, thereby saviAg human Iives'
5?. The above anatysis of air accidents makes the point tht aLL disasters could
not be ascribed to fate a[one and that many plane accidents are survivabLe, in other
wordsrthemannerinwhichtheyOccurdoesnotnecessariLyexcLudethesurvivaLof
passengers-
5S.Part.icuLaremphasisshouLdbeLaidontheexaminationofthefourcategories
of causes of death and injury in survivabte accidents: burns or intoxication
fotIoring fires, difficuLties in evacuating passengers, baggage projected in
thecabin,insufficientresistanceofseatsandseat-beIts,andcabinequ.ipment.
The main concLusions to be draun are that reLativeLy Littte'is stiLL known
about the toxicity and infLammabiLity of materiaLs contained in planes, and that
the evacuation of passengers - Hhen this is possible - may be hindered by baggage
orotherobjectsratthoughth'isrOuLdnotbethecaseiftheex'istingruLeswere
strict I'Y comPtied urith'
Itwoutdatsoappearthatmanyitemsofequipmentmak.ingupthestructure
ofthe interior of pLanes are transformed into dangerous projectiLes' However'
perhaps one of the most atarming factors is the defects frequentLy noted concerning
seats ('in particutarr the hray in xhich they are fixed to the fLoor) and seat-betts
(as regards which the Lack of a shouLder-strap is a particular shortcoming)'
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59. Your rapporteur takes the vier that, in order to effect'ivety improve
safety in aircraft, the rutes must be tightened or changed with regard to the
points mentioned in the above partgtaphe, ehu the air[ines must GompLy more strictLy
nith existing regutations. Actiorr sith this 6iil itt vitr tr{rst bc pursued at three
Leve[s: the manufacturers, the airtines, and the airpdrt and aviation authorities'
60. If the recommendations formu[ated are to ttcohe dt\ything more than good
intentions, thought must be given to th€ir imptementation'
The practicat structure for the effective devetopment of these safety
standards exists uithin internationaI organizations such as IATA and the ICAQ'
However, the Lack ofa proper decision-making frametrork makes it necessary for the
European countries to refer these prOblems to the European Ccmnunity to ensure
that our vieys can be properl.y coordinated and a stifiu[us be given to internationaL
action in the field of safety-
61. your rapporteur Houtd consider this an attractiVe sdLution Hhictr shoutd
be carefuLty sought yithin the frameHork'of cLose Godp€retion at Horld leveL' in
order to avoid fatting into the trap of over-Festriotive'rul''es {rom vhich the
European countries wouLd be the first to suffer'
62. with a view to standardizing European rutesr,a,Uecteive €tep would be
constituted by the coordination at community tevet of ''ufff€Pendds' by comparison
with the ICA0 Rutes.
63. FinaL Ly, it.woul.d be of the.greatest sat,ue if the"Corrmunlty''*ere to promote
the bringing together of European-airtines 'and civi t'aifports''within 'an 'ocganized
f ramework, rith a view to achleving in a non*bi'fiding"ilEnner-iupnouGfrent "df 'adfety
in aircraft, with regard to the aspects of safety which *e'have'Stressed above and
uhich are not the responsibitity of the manufacturers.
64. Such Conmunity action can be undertaken onLy inasmuch'as it is'integrated
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within an overatt programme for air safety, on the lines of the requests made
by ParLiament to the Commission for many years'
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC . 1-701 181)
tabLed by Mr SHERL0CK and Mr C0TTRELL
pursuant to RuLe 47 of the RuLes of Frocedure
on Saf ety fileasu,res in Ai rcraf t
ThG Europ€an Parliament,
a
- concerned thatr despite the generally high atandrrd of safety ln
corunercial aviatlon, many passengerg lose thair livec in aceidenca whieh
need not always be fatal, such as those caused by fire, aborted takc-offs,
burst tyres on take-off or landing and collisions on the ground,
; noting tlrat 75[ of air transp()rt .rccidcnts (rccur witlrin 3 kil,rmetrc*,rf
I the runway and that 7It of deaths in aircraft are due to fire'
- recalling that in t9E0 aII 30I occupants of a saudl Arabian airliner were
ktlled by fire uhen the aircraft was on the ground and that there are
many similarl though snaller incidents of death or injury being caused
by what were initially relatively minor incidentc,
bclieving that many such deathc or injuriea could be avoided through the
taking o! rclatlvcly simplc aafety nea3urGt whlch would not Involve
ex(.essivc. ly targe exlrenrliture hy airline olrc'riltorfi,
I. Calls upon the Commission to drau up a set of slmple but effective
gtandards to be applied and enforced in rGsPGct of airlines based ulthln
the Community and to examlne the possibility of extcndinE the aPplica-
tion of these standards to aII commercial aircraft usinE Community
. 
ai rports i
Z. Asks the Connicsionr !n formulrtinE thcac atendards, to Pay Particular
' attention to the following asPects of eafcty
. 
(a, thc amount and rlzc of luggage ircrnlttcd ta tht Pl.tangcr cabtn, which
at present lt guch ar to frcqucntly conttlguE0 a danger ln tho GvGnt
of an emergcncy by obstructing floors, aislce lnd axitlt
(b, thc f itt i1<1 of lrurst-prool r'.tt('h(.s to ovorlto.td lrx'ht'rri to prt'vt'lti i ltt'
injuries whir:h havc often bccn caurcd to pa$ficngnfl by otrlects (crlling
from theso lochora in tho Gvent of suddcn or violent aot'oilent of the
aircraft,
(el changes rn the rulcs on duty-frcc purcbasci tQ eI tdD rllont PaBfoagers
to buy these goods on lrnival, rather thrn bcforc doPtrt$rG. thus
rer+oving the ertra danger caused by the presencc u{thin thc cabin of
conglderablc guantities of inflarnmable liquld such ae aleohol and pcrtureorr
packed in glaee bottleB, and thereby alao reducing thc welght earried and
thug fuel coneumptionl guch.a measure would also fuqrrovc th€ quallty o!r
and noise gcnerated during, take-off and lancling:
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(d,
(c)
-----t-'
trpror"*nts ln aircroft
tcsting of seat8 and thc
foam which le at ?roscnt
to give off toxic fumes
the narking of energencY
of the aircraft thertby
the event of tire or an
seating, inclrrding dynanic as t'cll as static
use of ncw materials to rcplaee polyuretlrone
widaly trsctt cvt:n tlrotrgh it is I iilhl<' r'rpiti ly
and snoke in the event of a firr'i
exitg on the extcrior, alt well as thc intt'riort
considcrably aealsting the work of rcecuers ln
accident on the groundi
!. tn.tructc tte Presidcnt !o foruard thll rceolutlon
Comnierion of the Europoan Coflnunitles'
to tht Councll and tho
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COUNCIL DTBECTIVE
of 16 Decrmhcr 1980
on fulure coopention end mutull assistencc htrtweep the Mgmhr Stetes in the field of rir
. rccidcnl irvesligation
(l{0/ I 166 z l: I:(')
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN(.0MMUNITIF,S.
Having regard (o the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pcln [:cononric ('ommunity. and in particular
Articlc tt4 (2) tlrereol.
Whcreas thc technica! complexity of lurge modern
aircraft is constantly increasing: whereas, pursuunt
to ('haptcr 5 of Anncx I3 to the lnternationll Civil
Aviution ('onvention. it is incumbcnt upon the Con-
tracting Statcs to have accidents involving such air-
crali invcstigatctl inrmcdiatcly at the requcst of the
compctcnt Mcrnbcr Statcs hy indcpcrrdcnt expcrts
lionr a widc rungc ol'spcciirlizcd tcchnical and opcra-
tionul liclds:
Whereas not all Member Slates are abte to keep per-
manently or fully available the specialist staff and
appropriate technical facilities required for investi-
gating, major accidents ;
Whcreas the htlmogeneous technical development
of and the uniform performance standards in uvia-
tion in thc Mcnrber States make it possible l<lr them
to co()pcrirtc ilr thc invcstigation and prevention of
air accidcnts;
Whcrcas more than 90 Yo of accidents involve air-
crali oI up to and including 5 700 kg maximum per-
mirsihlc takc-ol'1'wcfht and whcre:rs it is atlvisahlc
lbr air sal'cty and for the prcvenlion ol' accidents
that such accidcnts also form the suhject of an
exchangc of infrlrmation,
HAS At)()PrEt) THIS t)tRECTIVE:
Article I
l. In the event of an accident involving a civil air-
craft. each Member State shall, by way of mgtual
assistance, Gndeavour to make available, on reqrrr.st
hy the Member State conducting the investig,rtirrn.
*ithin the limits of its possibilities and irs appro-
pri ute:
(a) installations. facilities and equipment owrrcd hv
its authorities for:
- 
the technical investigation ot' rvreckage antl
aircraft equipment and other objccis rc[.-
vunt to the invt'stigation.
- 
thc evaluation of inlormution from llight
parameter recorders and conilnuniculitrns
and sourrd-alirrnr recordcrs in thc cockpit.
and the computer tio.ug. and evaluation o[
air accident data:
(b) accident inyestigation e\perts to undcrtrke speci-
fic lirsks. hut only wherc' an invcstig.rtion i.
opencd following a rnujor rccidcnt.
2. Such muturl ilssistrncs should bc givtn. as lirr
as possible, free of charge.
(rtkle 2
Mgmber Etater shall periodisally inform one
another of incidenls nol rcsultirtg in uccirlcrrts untl
of the results of investigationr trl' :tccid!.nts involr-
ing aircraft of u rurrinlunr pcrrrrissihlt tukc-trl'l'
wcight up to ilnd inclullilrg 5 7()t) tg proritlttl th.rt
such resulls ure availublc in a lbrrn corrcsporrding to
that of the accidentrincident data rr.porting fornr
druwn up by the lntcrnltionul ('ir il Ar iutiorr
Organization.
t
{
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Such information and such results shall be
iictrangeO in so far as they contribute to lhe
improtim.nt of air safety and accident prevcntion'
Article 3
Aftet consulting the Commission, Member States
shall adopt the mcasures neccssaryfor thc im-plcrncn-
iarion of'this Directive with cffcct from t July l9tll'
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Article 4
This Directive is addressed to the Memher States'
Done at Brussels, 16 December 1980.
For thc Countil
The ltresidmt
Colette FLUS('H
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